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1   Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow at the  African Centre for the Constructive Resolu-
tion of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

1. The United Nations and the  
Integrated Approach 
The mixed findings of a number of recent peacekeeping, humanitarian 
and peacebuilding evaluation reports2 and related research,3 and the 
poor sustainability of peacebuilding activities undertaken to date, have 
led to a renewed focus on efforts aimed at improving our ability to 
undertake meaningful, coherent, coordinated and sustainable peace 
interventions. For example, the Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding, 
which analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the past dec-
ade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it 
terms a ‘strategic deficit’, as the most significant obstacle to sustain-
able peacebuilding (Smith, 2003:16). That study found that more than 
55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger 
country strategy.  
 
The UN system has responded to this challenge by commissioning a 
series of high-level panels and working groups4 to consider various 
aspects of this dilemma, and by experimenting with various strategic 
and operational coordination models.5 Over the last half-decade, these 
efforts have culminated in the Integrated Approach concept. This re-
fers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the 
planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the 
UN family are integrated into a single country-level UN system, when 
it undertakes complex peacebuilding missions. 
 
Complex peacebuilding missions are multi-faceted systems that pro-
vide for parallel, concurrent and interlinked (short-, medium- and 
long-term) programmes, working to prevent disputes from escalating 
or to avoid relapse into violent conflict by addressing both the imme-
diate consequences and the root causes of a conflict system. The post-
conflict peacebuilding process typically, but not always, starts with a 
                                                 
2 Amongst others, Cutillo, 2006; Dahrendorf, 2003; Donini, 2002; Porter, 2002; Stockton, 
2002; Sommers, 2000; Reindorp & Wiles, 2001; Duffield, Lautze & Jones, 1998 and 
Eriksson, 1996. 
3 For instance, Dobbins, 2005; Paris, 2004; Collier, 2003; and Stedman, Cousens & Roth-
child, 2002. 
4 Amongst others, the Panel on Peace Operations (UN, 2000b); the Working Group on 
Transition Issues (UN, 2004a); the Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN, 
2004b); the Secretary-General’s In Larger Freedom report (UN, 2005a); and the Panel on 
System-Wide Coherence (UN, 2006c). 
5 For example, the Integrated Mission Task Force concept for mission planning, the Strate-
gic Framework concept in Afghanistan and the Results Focused Transitional Framework 
(RFTF) in Sierra Leone. 
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cease-fire agreement or peace agreement that calls upon the interna-
tional community to support the peace process. It typically progresses 
through three stages: stabilization, transition and consolidation. The 
peacebuilding process ends when a society has developed the capacity 
to manage and sustain its own peace process without external support. 
This requires a wide range of internal and external actors, including 
governments, civil society, the private sector and international agen-
cies, working together in a coherent and coordinated effort. These ac-
tors undertake a broad range of programmes that span the political, 
security, development, governance and reconciliation dimensions. 
Collectively and cumulatively, these programmes address both the 
causes and consequences of the conflict system, and build momentum 
over time that facilitates its transformation. In the short term, the goal 
of a peacebuilding system is to assist the internal actors in stabilizing 
the peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict, but the ulti-
mate aim is to support them in transforming the causes of the conflict 
and laying the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and 
development.6  
 
Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, issued a note on inte-
grated missions that describes the concept as follows: ‘An integrated 
mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understand-
ing of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to 
be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this 
integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution 
towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different 
capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.’7  
 
The ‘integrated missions’ concept thus refers to a type of mission 
where there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that can 
generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as well as a com-
prehensive operational approach involving the political, security, de-
velopment, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian, UN 
actors at country level.8  
 
The note of the Secretary-General on integrated missions establishes 
the integrated missions concept as the guiding principle for future 
post-conflict complex operations. It states that: ‘Integration is the gui-
ding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN op-
erations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimen-
                                                 
6 de Coning, 2007:48 & NEPAD, 2005. 
7 United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-
General on 9 December 2005 (UN, 2005b), paragraph 4. See also the Revised Note of 
Guidance on Integrated Missions, dated 17 January 2006, and released under a Note from 
the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006, paragraph 4. 
8 United Nations, Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines endorsed by 
the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006, UN, 2006b: 3.  
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sions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human 
rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support 
strategy.’9  
 
Current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has reaffirmed the inte-
grated approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-
conflict situations where the UN has a country team and a multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operation, or a political or peacebuilding 
office, whether these missions are structurally integrated or not.10  
 
The 2008 Secretary-General’s decision on integration introduces the 
notion of the ‘integrated approach’. It differs from the ‘integrated mis-
sions’ concept in that it does not require structural integration, al-
though providing for it, where appropriate. Instead, the integrated ap-
proach refers to a strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping 
operation and the UN country team that ensures that all components of 
the UN system operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, 
and in close collaboration with other partners.  
 
Thus defined, an integrated approach requires: 
 
(1) ‘a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives, 
(2) closely aligned or integrated planning, 
(3) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the 
delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and 
(4) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.’11 
 
There are at least two ways in which the integrated approach is cur-
rently used within the UN. The first refers to system-wide coherence, 
and the term is used in a technical sense to denote a specific type of 
mission structure. Through UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 
of 1991, the UN has been given the role of coordinating all humanitar-
ian assistance through the Emergency Relief Coordinator internation-
ally, and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system at country level. 
The UN plays a similar role in development coordination through the 
UN Development Group (UNDG) and the Resident Coordinator (RC) 
system at country level. In most cases these two functions are com-
bined as the RC/HC function. In the UN peace operation context, a 
mission becomes an ‘integrated mission’ when the RC/HC function is 
integrated with the peace operation through the appointment of special 
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) that 
is at the same time responsible for the RC/HC. The Secretary-
                                                 
9 Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, paragraph 4. 
10 Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration, Decisions of the Secretary-General, 25 June 
2008 Policy Committee, United Nations, New York. 
11 Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration. 
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General’s Note on Integrated Missions applies to all missions that fall 
in this category.12 In this sense, ‘integrated missions’ thus refers to 
‘integration’ across the UN system, in that it links, through the 
DSRSG RC/HC function, the peace and security responsibilities of a 
UN peace operation on the one hand, with the development and hu-
manitarian functions represented by the various UN agencies present 
in a country, on the other. These agencies are organised under the um-
brella of the UN Country Team, and many are present in most devel-
oping countries, even in the absence of a conflict or natural disaster.  
 
The second way in which the integrated approach is employed is more 
generic, in that it has become a synonym for multi-dimensional or 
complex operations. In that sense it refers to the ‘integration’ of the 
various military, police and civilian dimensions of a peace operation 
in a single office or unit. For instance, when the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)13 establishes an ‘Integrated Mission 
Training Cell’ it is meant to indicate that the military, police and civil-
ian training functions in a particular mission have been integrated into 
a single unit. This type of usage of the concept is, however, confusing 
because it does not measure up to the system-wide intention of the 
concept. When the military, police and civilian components of a peace 
operations come together to establish a multi-component entity this is 
rather usually described as a ‘joint’ entity, such as a ‘Joint Operations 
Center’ or a ‘Joint Mission Analysis Cell’. The integration concept 
should only be used when parts of the peacekeeping operation and 
parts of the development and humanitarian community that is not part 
of the peacekeeping mission are brought together, i.e. when the secu-
rity-development divide is bridged.  
 
Integration, in the context of an UN integrated mission, is not intended 
to imply the incorporation of one entity into another, or subsuming 
one entity under the management control of another – each UN de-
partment, programme, fund, office, etc. maintains its own identity, 
management system, funding lines and financial responsibility. In-
stead, it refers to the processes, mechanisms and structures that are 
applied to connect these various UN entities, and the peacebuilding 
dimensions within which they carry out their work, together into a 
single interlinked, mutually supportive comprehensive UN country-
level system. The objectives of this kind of integration are harmoniza-
tion, alignment and coherence with a view to greater overall efficiency 
and effectiveness. The assumption of the integrated approach concept 
                                                 
12  ‘This updated Note of Guidance applies to all integrated missions in which the SRSG is 
supported by a RC and HC serving as the Deputy Special Representative Of the Secre-
tary-General (DSRSG/RC/HC).’ Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, paragraph 3. 
13 As of 1 January 2008, the DPKO split into two departments: the Department of Peace 
Operations (DPO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). See General Assembly 
Resolution A/RES/61/256 of 22 March 2007. 
Implications of a Comprehensive or Integrated Approach for Training in UN and AU Peace Operations  5 
is thus that a coherent14 approach that manages to produce a compre-
hensive and coordinated UN system-wide effort will have a more re-
levant,15 effective,16 efficient17 and sustainable18 impact19 on the peace 
process than a disjointed, fractured and contradictory approach. 
The Comprehensive Approach 
Within the UN system there are various semi-autonomous agencies, 
funds, offices and programmes with a humanitarian and development 
mandate, departments of the UN Secretariat responsible for political 
affairs, peace operations and field support, and offices in the Secre-
tariat responsible for humanitarian coordination and peacebuilding 
support. Although the core of the UN integration effort will aim at 
achieving system-wide coherence among these members of the overall 
UN system, the integration effort is not meant to be exclusively UN. 
The members of the UN system, and the UN integrated mission spe-
cifically, will facilitate, and participate in, various other coordination 
initiatives aimed at promoting harmonization among the external ac-
tors, and alignment between the internal and external actors in any 
given country or regional conflict system. In some circles, this broader 
strategic coordination process of establishing linkages among all the 
external actors in a given country or regional conflict system has be-
come known as the ‘comprehensive approach’.  
 
There are also initiatives underway to improve coherence internally 
among the different government departments engaged in international 
diplomacy, peace operations, development and humanitarian assis-
                                                 
14  ‘Coherence’, in the peacebuilding context, is the effort to direct the wide range of pro-
grammes undertaken in the peace, security, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions 
of a peacebuilding system towards a common objective (de Coning, 2007:66). It is impor-
tant to recognize that the dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems means that 
coherence can never be fully achieved. However, we may distinguish between systems 
where there are less coherence and ones where there is more coherence, and it is recog-
nized that the process of striving for coherence is a catalyst for more efficiency in a sys-
tem. 
15  ‘Relevance’ here refers to the extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consis-
tent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and 
donors’ policies (OECD, 2002:32). 
16  ‘Effectiveness’ refers to the extent to which the objectives of an intervention were 
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance 
(OECD, 2002:20). 
17 ‘Efficiency’ is a measure of how economically resources and inputs (funds, expertise, 
time, etc.) are converted to results (OECD, 2002:21). ‘Economy’ in this context refers to 
the absence of waste for a given output: thus, an activity is deemed economical when the 
costs of the scarce resources used approximate the minimum needed to achieve planned 
objectives (OECD, 2002:20). 
18  ‘Sustainability’ refers to the continuation of benefits from an intervention after major 
assistance has been completed, the probability of continued long-term benefits, and the 
resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time (OECD, 2002:36). 
19 ‘Impact’ refers to the positive and negative, primary and secondary short-, intermediate- 
and long-term effects produced by an intervention, whether directly or indirectly, intended 
or unintended (OECD, 2002:24). 
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tance, and this process has become known as the ‘whole-of-
government’ approach. In Canada this initiative has become known as 
the ‘3D’ process, as it combines the defence, diplomatic and develop-
ment functions of government. The EU and NATO have also endorsed 
the ‘comprehensive approach’ concept, and are busy developing their 
own tools and mechanisms to improve their own internal coherence, 
as well as their cooperation with other international organizations so 
that they become better able to contribute to a larger system-wide ef-
fect. 
 
All these initiatives have a similar aim: to achieve greater harmoniza-
tion and synchronization among the activities of the different interna-
tional and local actors, and across the analysis, planning, implementa-
tion, management and evaluation aspects of the programme cycle. The 
goal is to bridge the security–development divide, and to integrate the 
political, security, developmental, economic and other dimensions re-
quired to ensure a system-wide response to any specific conflict sys-
tem. 
 
The UN’s integrated approach concept should thus be understood in a 
wider international context where coherence is pursued at the national 
level among government departments (whole-of-government), and 
internationally among donors (harmonization); between donor and 
recipients (alignment); within the UN development, humanitarian and 
environment dimensions (system-wide coherence); and among the 
peace, security, human rights, humanitarian and development dimen-
sions of the UN system at country level (integrated approach and inte-
grated missions).  
 
‘Integrated missions’ has now been officially accepted in the UN Sys-
tem as the mission structure of choice.20 It will be the dominant man-
agement structure for UN complex peace operations in the near to 
mid-term, and it is likely that the EU, the African Union (AU) and 
others will try to adapt some of its core features to their own missions 
in future.  
 
                                                 
20 Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, paragraph 4. 
2. Integrated Missions and the African 
Union 
The AU in particular has started to adopt some of the integrated mis-
sions terminology in its evolving African Standby Force doctrine.21 
However, it is important to distinguish between the scope for integra-
tion that exists within the UN system and that of the African Union. 
Whilst it is possible, under certain circumstances, to integrate the UN 
RC/HC function with UN peace operations to establish an UN inte-
grated mission in the system-wide coherence context, it is inconceiv-
able that the UN RC/HC function could be integrated with AU, EU, 
NATO, or any other non-UN peace operation, because the UN RC and 
HC functions have a specific mandate in the international legal con-
text that can not become subservient to the overall direction of a re-
gional organization. The opposite if possible, however, and has been 
done in the case of Kosovo, for instance, where the EU was responsi-
ble for a specific pillar under the overall direction of the SRSG of the 
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Even if this were possible from an 
institutional perspective, it would be undesirable from a humanitarian 
independence perspective, in that such integration is likely to nega-
tively affect the perceived neutrality and independence of the humani-
tarian community.  
 
This is not to say that the UN development and humanitarian commu-
nity, and others like the AU, EU and NATO, cannot coordinate close-
ly or even, under certain circumstances, cooperate – but it is incon-
ceivable that they can be ‘integrated’ in the same technical system-
wide meaning that this concept implies in the UN system context. 
 
Instead, ‘integration’ in the AU context is used in a generic sense to 
refer to multi-dimensional coordination and cooperation. For instance, 
the AU’s ‘Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF)’ refers to a mecha-
nism whereby the military, police and civilian planning functions are 
combined in one process.22 This differs from the way the concept is 
used in the UN system where, for instance, the UN’s ‘Integrated Mis-
sion Task Force (IMTF)’, refers to the coming together of planners 
                                                 
21 The African Union embarked on an initiative to develop an African Standby Force in May 
2003 when the first ASF Policy Framework was adopted by the 3rd meeting of the African 
Chiefs of Defence Staff, and endorsed by the Maputo Summit in July 2003. The concept 
has subsequently been further developed through a series of workshops in 2005 and 2006 
that examined doctrine, training and evaluation, logistics, standing operating procedures, 
and command, control and communications. 
22 ‘Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force’, African 
Union Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), 1 September 2006. 
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from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and 
planners from the UN Department of Political Affairs, UN Develop-
ment Group, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) and other UN agencies in a system-wide initiative. When 
integration is used in this way in the AU and other non-UN contexts, it 
should be understood as multi-component coordination among peace 
and security actors in the same mission, and not as system-wide inte-
gration that is aimed at bridging the security-development divide, as it 
is understood in the UN context. 
 
3. Training Implications of Integrated 
Missions  
The remainder of this paper considers the training implications of the 
integrated missions concept for UN and AU peace operations. From a 
training perspective, there is a need to foster a general awareness and 
minimum level of understanding of the integrated missions concept 
among all persons working in or alongside such a mission. This gen-
eral awareness training should be supplemented with specialized train-
ing for those personnel who perform specific functions related to inte-
grated missions. 
 
Core elements that should inform any integrated missions training cur-
riculum are: 
 
 support to the implementation of a comprehensive peace pro-
cess in a post-conflict setting, i.e. where there is a peace pro-
cess in place and the UN or AU have been asked to support the 
parties with the implementation of this process;  
 recognition that a comprehensive approach requires a system-
wide process that can cover the political, security, develop-
ment, human rights and, where appropriate, humanitarian, 
dimensions;23 
 awareness of the different phases in each peacebuilding mis-
sion (stabilization, transition and consolidation) phase,24 and 
knowledge of how the roles and responsibilities of the inter-
nal25 and external26 actors change over time as they progress 
through these stages;27 
                                                 
23 There is broad consensus on these dimensions, although some add further dimensions. 
See, for instance the African Union´s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
Framework (AU, 2006) that consists of six constitutive elements. This is the only frame-
work to include gender as a separate element. Whilst some, such as the Utstein (Smith, 
2004:27) and NEPAD (2005:13–15) examples, deal with humanitarian assistance as part 
of the socio-economic development category, many in the humanitarian community argue 
that humanitarian assistance falls outside the scope of peacebuilding, and should thus not 
be included in any such peacebuilding categorization. The Note on Integrated Missions 
(2006b:1) lists seven dimensions: political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule 
of law, social and security. 
24 For more information on these phases, see de Coning, 2007:49 
25 ‘Internal actors’ are understood as all local actors in the country or conflict system where 
peacebuilding activities take place. 
26 ‘External actors’ are all international actors engaged in undertaking humanitarian assis-
tance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in a given country or conflict sys-
tem. 
27 There are various different interpretations of these phases, but most convey the same es-
sential progression. See for instance the Association of the U.S. Army & Centre for Stra-
tegic and International Studies (CSIS), Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework, 
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 understanding that, in order for all these dimensions to be 
brought into play in a synchronized, appropriately sequenced 
and coherent fashion, the members of UN family, which con-
sists of various departments in the Secretariat,28 independently 
constituted funds, agencies and programmes,29 and the Bretton 
Woods institutions,30 need to operate as one integrated UN 
system at country level;  
 when regional organizations like the AU or EU are mandated 
with some of the peace-operation related dimensions of this 
overall response, that special mechanisms need to be estab-
lished to ensure close coordination between the UN system 
and such regional organizations; 
 resolve to establish a range of processes, mechanisms and 
structures that will generate common assessments, integrated 
plans, operational coordination mechanisms, common moni-
toring31 tools and an ability to evaluate32 the overall effect and 
impact of the integrated approach among all the relevant ele-
ments of the UN system, and other partners, such as the AU or 
EU. 
3.1 United Nations Personnel 
All those participating in some way in a UN integrated mission need 
to be aware of what an integrated mission is, why this specific type of 
mission design is being applied in a given situation, and which consti-
tutive elements of the UN family have been integrated. A basic under-
standing is required of the various dimensions of peacebuilding opera-
tions, the phases of peacebuilding, and the roles and responsibilities of 
the various organizations that contribute to the overall effect, in order 
for all UN personnel to understand where they fit in this integrated 
and comprehensive approach. Otherwise, individuals and their groups 
                                                 
Washington DC, 2002, in which they identify three stages: initial response, transforma-
tion and fostering sustainability. 
28 In the peacekeeping and peacebuilding context these are the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS), the Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
29 Such as the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), etc. 
30 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
31  ‘Monitoring’ is a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specific 
indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development 
intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and 
progress in the use of allocated funds (OECD, 2002:18). 
32  ‘Evaluation’ refers to the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or com-
pleted project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results (OECD, 
2002:21). 
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and organizations, are likely to work in isolation from each other and 
the larger UN system of which they are a part.  
 
When people work in a disconnected fashion they are likely to start 
working at cross-purposes with each other. The system gets drained of 
its energy, as people apply pressure on each other, instead of focusing 
their combined and collective efforts on the conflict system that the 
peacebuilding mission is meant to deal with. Once individuals have 
grasped this essential insight, they become enablers who can identify 
potential coordination problems and rectify them at their level, thereby 
contributing to the overall coherence of the UN system. 
 
Incorporating a module, or modules, on the integrated approach con-
cept into every relevant training module, course or exercise, aimed at 
UN staff participating in some way in integrated missions, can con-
tribute to such general awareness. It is important to keep this kind of 
general awareness training focused on the intent and objectives of the 
integrated approach, and not on its structures and mechanisms. The 
latter will differ from mission to mission, and do not necessarily con-
vey the meaning or intent of the integrated approach concept. It is a 
common error to explain the integrated approach as a mission struc-
ture, as opposed to an ‘approach’ that should inform the work of every 
individual UN staff member, regardless of his or her role in the struc-
ture. Those who have grasped the functional logic of the comprehen-
sive approach will be able to apply the integrated approach concept to 
their own work environment, irrespective of the form (mission struc-
ture) a specific mission takes.  
 
All civilian, police and military personnel likely to work in an UN in-
tegrated mission should thus receive training on the integrated ap-
proach concept, whether at the generic level, as specialized training, 
mission-specific, pre-deployment or in-mission training. For instance, 
civilians deployed as a human rights observers should ideally receive 
information on the integrated approach concept as part of their generic 
human rights observer training, as part of the pre-mission briefings 
and preparations and as part of their in-mission induction and other 
mission-specific training courses. In this way, personnel will develop 
an understanding of the overall UN system of which they are part, and 
their role therein.  
3.2 African Union, European Union and other Non-UN  
Personnel 
As noted earlier, ‘integration’ in the context of the African Union or 
the European Union is often used to refer to the coming together of 
the civilian, police and military components of the AU or EU mission 
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in a ‘joint’ entity, such as a Joint Operation Centre. All AU personnel 
and those working alongside them (for instance UN, EU or NATO 
advisors and private contractors, as was the case in the African Mis-
sion in Sudan (AMIS)) need to understand the integration concept as it 
is used by the AU. 
 
Furthermore, AU personnel and all other non-UN external actors op-
erating alongside a UN integrated mission will also need to have some 
basic understanding of the integrated approach concept as used by the 
UN system, so that they can know how best to relate to it in the con-
text of the wider country-level peacebuilding system of which they are 
a part. As explained, a UN integrated mission forms part of a wider 
peacebuilding system that incorporates all external peacebuilding ac-
tors at country level.  
 
All external actors that form part of this wider peacebuilding system 
are interdependent, in that none of them can achieve the overall peace-
building goals and objectives on their own. Each entity or programme 
contributes to only a part of the overall effort, and it is the combined, 
cumulative overall effort that builds momentum towards peace. Each 
of the various programmes, and each actor responsible for implement-
ing these programmes, is thus mutually dependent on others to 
achieve a system-wide effect. Even if the external actors are not part 
of the UN integrated mission, they are linked into the same overall 
interdependent system.  
 
Within this country-level context, the UN integrated mission will usu-
ally play a leading coordination role, as it officially represents the will 
of the international community through its UN Security Council man-
date and reporting obligations. UN Security Council resolutions au-
thorizing UN peace operations typically include a specific mandate to 
perform an overarching coordinating role. There will be an expecta-
tion that most non-UN external actors will participate in the overall 
comprehensive approach, and there will be various processes, mecha-
nisms and structures to facilitate the coordination, harmonization and 
alignment processes necessary to achieve system-wide coherence.  
3.3 The Humanitarian Community  
The humanitarian community, including the humanitarian elements of 
the UN family, has a special mandate that sets it apart from the politi-
cal, security, human rights and development dimensions of the coun-
try-level peacebuilding system. Humanitarian action is premised on a 
concern for humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence from 
political influence. This implies that its actors cannot participate in the 
UN integrated approach concept, or a wider concept of peacebuilding 
Implications of a Comprehensive or Integrated Approach for Training in UN and AU Peace Operations  13 
coherence, to the same degree as the other dimensions can, because its 
mandate excludes it from involvement in actions aimed at conflict re-
solution, or changing the conflict environment through peacebuilding. 
The independence of the humanitarian actors (as opposed to the inter-
dependence of the peacebuilding actors) is recognized and safe-
guarded in the UN concept of an integrated mission.33  
 
However, among the humanitarian community there is an expectation 
that most humanitarian actors at country level will participate in vari-
ous coordination processes, and that some of these processes will be 
facilitated by the United Nations. The humanitarian coordination role 
of the UN has become widely accepted, and the UN serves in this role 
by providing a UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) at country level, 
supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA). 
  
The UN integrated missions concept recognizes the independence of 
humanitarian action. At the same time, it is also considered necessary 
that the work of the humanitarian community is factored into the thin-
king of the larger peacebuilding system. This delicate relationship is 
managed by creating two DSRSGs, and giving one of them the spe-
cific responsibilities of the HC function. As indicated briefly above, 
this DSRSG is commonly referred to as the DSRSG RC/HC, where 
the ‘RC’ refers to the Resident Coordinator or development coordina-
tion role, and the ‘HC’ to the Humanitarian Coordinator role. The 
DSRSG RC/HC is also the Deputy Designated Official (DDO) in the 
UN security system, which ensures that UN security decisions are not 
premised exclusively on political and security considerations, but that 
they also take into consideration the perspectives of the humanitarian 
and development communities. 
 
This approach means that the humanitarian community has to be fac-
tored in, and reckoned with, in both the UN integrated approach and 
the wider country-level peacebuilding framework. The humanitarian 
community should be understood as connected with, but insulated 
from, the wider peacebuilding system, in the same way that a specific 
sub-network may be part of a larger network while also protected 
from it by a firewall.  
 
It is useful to think of the humanitarian community as those working 
‘in’ conflict, and of the rest of the external peacebuilding actors as 
those working ‘on’ conflict. In other words, whilst the peacebuilding 
system intends to have an effect ‘on’ the conflict system, the humani-
tarian actors do not. Although they operate ‘in’ a conflict context, 
their intent is focused on alleviating suffering and saving lives. They 
                                                 
33 Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, paragraph 10. 
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achieve their neutrality and impartiality – and through it access to tho-
se in need, regardless of who is in control of a given area – by deliber-
ately not seeking to have an effect ‘on’ the conflict itself. The humani-
tarian community should thus be connected with the peacebuilding 
system to the extent necessary for it and the system to mutually man-
age their presence and role in the same theatre, but they should not be 
expected to conform to, or participate in, those integration efforts of 
the system aimed at pursuing system-wide coherence. It is vital for the 
peacebuilding actors, including those in the UN integrated mission, to 
understand the unique mandate of the humanitarian actors, and for the 
humanitarian actors to receive training on the UN integrated approach 
concept and the wider peacebuilding context within which they will 
operate.  
3.4 Internal Actors 
The internal actors are the most important element in the wider peace-
building context. They are principally responsible for implementing 
their own peace process, and the work of the UN, AU and other non-
UN external actors is carried out in support of their efforts. The inter-
nal actors that is responsible for liaison with the external actors need 
to understand the ‘integrated approach’ concept, and the wider peace-
building system context, so that they can develop an understanding of 
how best to interact with it, in order to maximise the interaction to 
their own greatest benefit. It is, at the same time, critical that the ex-
ternal actors make an effort to understand the local context within 
which they operate, which includes a historic and socio-cultural 
grounding, as well as a needs-based approach. There will always be a 
tension between the need for international templates, like the inte-
grated approach, that make it possible for international organizations 
like the UN to operate many different missions with one common 
support structure, and the need for each of these missions to reflect the 
unique context within which it has to operate. This tension will inform 
the detail structure of each mission, and will be a marriage between 
the universal template and the specific context. There is thus a need 
for both the internal and external actors to learn from and influence 
each other continuously. 
 
One criticism of the integrated approach concept, and external actor 
coherence processes in general, is that it generates a united external 
actor front that leaves the internal actors with little choice but to ac-
cept the influence of the external actors. However, the converse is also 
true, in that if the internal actors learn to use the integrated missions to 
their advantage then their transaction costs will be minimized, as they 
will not have to expend resources to persuade a wide and diverse ex-
ternal actor community. Instead, the internal actors will only have to 
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persuade or influence a few key nodes within the integrated mission 
and external community, where after the contagion process within the 
closely connected integrated mission and interlinked external actor 
community should take over, spreading the message on its own. Spe-
cial efforts should thus be made to inform key actors within the inter-
nal actor community of the underlying ideas and objectives of the in-
tegrated approach concept, and the wider country-level peacebuilding 
system approach. 
 
For all the external categories, UN and AU integrated mission person-
nel, non-UN external peacebuilding actors and humanitarian actors, 
training can be conducted within their own professional fields, as pre-
mission training, as mission-induction training and as ongoing mission 
specific training. For internal actors, special opportunities need to be 
created within the mission or country-level context.  
 
In all these cases, integrated or joint training is encouraged, with the 
learning environment enriched by having multiple agencies represent-
ing some of the different actors involved in the field. Most military 
peacekeeping training centres have incorporated some form of inte-
grated training in their peacekeeping training centres, and with very 
positive results. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has 
integrated its military and civilian training units, and most UN peace 
operations now have integrated training units at their mission head-
quarters.  
3.5 Specialized Training  
Specialized training is needed to prepare those who are to perform 
specialized roles in maintaining the interface between the various pea-
cebuilding dimensions. This includes personnel involved in undertak-
ing assessments, planning, management, coordination, monitoring and 
evaluation. Each of these functions takes on a special meaning within 
the integrated approach context, as these are the key processes that 
generate a common understanding of the conflict system, a common 
strategic vision, common objectives, a comprehensive plan, common 
management and coordination processes, mechanisms and structures, 
common monitoring processes and joint evaluation processes. 
 
Over the years, the main actors in each peacebuilding dimension (po-
litical, security, development, rule of law and human rights) have de-
veloped their own policies and procedures for assessment, planning, 
management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation. For instance, 
the UN development community has developed the Common Country 
Assessment (CCA) and UN Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF) process, and the World Bank has developed the Poverty 
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Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, whilst the humanitarian 
community has developed the Common Humanitarian Assessment 
Plan (CHAP) process. In Liberia, some of these processes were ini-
tially brought together under the Results Focussed Transitional Frame-
work (RFTF) in 2005, and later under an interim (2007) and then a 
fully-fledged Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) called ‘Lift Liberia’.  
 
The UN Secretary-General has approved a new integrated planning 
process, the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).34 The mili-
tary and other security actors also have their own highly developed 
and specialized assessment, planning and monitoring tools. For in-
stance, NATO uses the Effects Based Approach to Operations 
(EBAO), and many military officers that have been trained in EBAO 
will thus approach assessments, planning and evaluation from that 
perspective. 
 
Specialized training will thus be needed for all those who will be wor-
king in assessment, planning, management, coordination, monitoring 
and evaluation in either the UN integrated approach context, or the 
wider country-level peacebuilding context. They will have to under-
stand the UN integrated approach and the interdependence of all those 
interconnected through the country-level peacebuilding system, as 
well as the specialized processes, like the IMPP; and specialized struc-
tures, like the DSRSG RC/HC unction, and the various mechanisms 
that flow from it. Eventually the system will either have to develop an 
interface mechanism(s) that makes these various processes inter-
operable, or that can integrate them at a higher level, or else it will 
have to develop new common processes and then persuade each par-
ticipating organization to abandon its own processes and adopt the 
new common process. In the meantime, those closely involved with 
these processes should learn as much as possible from each other 
about their respective policies and processes. Then, armed with this 
knowledge and working together, they can chart a way forward, using 
a common vehicle such as the IMPP. 
 
Specialized training should identify those in senior management, as 
well as those staffing each of these processes (assessments, planning, 
operational coordination, monitoring and evaluation) and provide 
them with the specialized knowledge necessary to understand each 
others’ processes, mechanisms and structures. This will help them to 
jointly develop the new processes, mechanisms and structures neces-
sary to achieve inter-operability among their different systems, with a 
view to producing common assessments, common planning, inte-
grated management and coordination, joint monitoring and collabora-
tive evaluations.  
                                                 
34 The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), UN, 2006b. 
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This would imply that those working in the Integrated Mission Plan-
ning Teams (IMPTs), Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), Joint Mission 
Analysis Cells (JMACs), Joint Logistic Operations Centres (JLOCs), 
and those engaged in the PRPS, UNDAFs, CHAPs, etc. should be 
trained in each other’s policies and processes, as well as in any com-
mon tools that may be produced in the process. This can be done at 
the strategic level, e.g. by bringing together those working in these 
various equivalent areas at the UN headquarters in New York, but it 
should be undertaken especially at country level, where these different 
specialists should meet to teach and learn from each other about their 
respective policies and processes. Developing an integrated and sys-
temic way of co-working among these agencies is in itself a process, 
and such training interventions should be understood as team-building 
and process enablers, as much as they are primarily vehicles for shar-
ing knowledge.  
 

4. Conclusions 
 
The UN Integrated Approach concept has now become accepted as the 
guiding principle for future UN-led post-conflict complex peacebuild-
ing missions. It is important that all those who participate in some or 
other form in UN integrated missions, or those who work alongside 
such missions – whether as part of a wider country level peacebuild-
ing system, as part of the humanitarian community, or as internal ac-
tors – develop a basic understanding of this concept as formulated for 
the UN system, as well as the wider country-level peacebuilding sys-
tem of which they are part. 
 
The UN’s Integrated Approach concept is increasingly being adopted 
by the AU and other regional organizations. However, there are im-
portant differences between the UN’s system-wide coherence ap-
proach to integration, and the multi-component or ‘joint’ integration 
approach followed by the AU and other regional organizations. It is 
important to take note of these differences, and to focus training pack-
ages accordingly. 
 
Training is a critical tool for the dissemination of new policies, proc-
esses and tools, especially in highly diversified organizations or sys-
tems. Training can thus be used as a tool to introduce the integrated 
approach concept to existing UN and AU missions, and those working 
alongside them, as well as to prepare those who will be deployed to 
such missions in future. 
 
Specialized training is also needed to prepare those currently working 
in assessment, planning, management, coordination, monitoring and 
evaluation. These are critical areas of interface across the many agen-
cies engaged in the various peacebuilding dimensions (political, secu-
rity, development and human rights). As such they represent the most 
important nodes that will need to be influenced, if mission coherence 
and system-wide coherence are to be improved.  
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